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FRANCESCA DELL’ORTO(Università di Torino e Sorbonne-Paris IV)
RECONSTRUCTING OPACITY.
HUSSERLIAN MOTIVATION AS A ‘THIRD SYNTHESIS’
The following considerations aim at reassessing the concept ofmotivation within the horizon of Husserlian work, in order toshow the extent to which it is crucial to ground the transcendentalsubject (probably more crucial than Husserl himself hadremarked) and, for this very reason, to threw it into crisis. In myopinion, the most important gain of the transcendental approachis to have remarked that the constitution of the ‘natural ego’(psyche) is not equivalent to the constitution of the ‘real ego’ andaccordingly that the psyche always leaves a ‘residue’: bycriticizing the natural attitude, Husserl insists on the fact that thepsyche animating the body is not the same that produces thecultural and communal realizations of men. Between Leben and
Erlebnis a discard lingers on, notably a temporal discard, thatmakes the transcendental finally possible i.e., more concretely,knowledge and its transmission. What I would like to suggest isthat this residue stratifies itself forming the ‘motivation’s realm’,which is a sort of ‘third synthesis’ between the physical one andthe psychological one, parallel to the ‘tertiary time’, highlighted byPaul Ricoeur1, between the one of the world and the one ofconsciousness. The structure of motivations touches, as theKantian Schematism, the most central core of time and the inter-twinement (Verflechtung) of presentations and presentifications,retentions and memories, retentions and protentions and so on.The domain of motivations is essentially constituted by the
Gesetzlichkeit which derives from the stratifications of sense ofbeing of the ego. It constitutes itself in the form of time and theflow of retentions and protentions, in their synthetic unity,correspond in its turn to the universal form of ‘motivation’. Themotivation is a sort of transcendental practical, economical and
1P. Ricoeur, Time and narrative 3: Narrated time, Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1988, p. 354.
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ethical schema, that turns Erlebnisse into actions. We will seehereinafter which name to give to the motivational sphere and,consequently, to what transformations the transcendental domainwill be subjected. In order to understand the deep nature ofmotivation it will be necessary to start from reconstructing the ge-nesis of the original opacity characterizing the phenomenologicalfield: this opacity configures itself as a spiritual intersection (thatis no more subjective than objective) mediating, constituting,binding and at the same time making possible, the reciprocalconnection between the world and the individual consciousness.The introduction of person’s and community’s dimension inthe second part of Ideas II goes hand in hand with the recon-figuration of the ego-psyche polarity by dint of the spirit (Geist).The notion of Geist is quite problematic, since it does not point outan empirical counterpart of the pure subjectivity, but rather acultural one, whose status complexifies considerably thephenomenological framework. The spirit proclaims the limits ofpsychologism (which Husserl ascribes to the ‘natural attitude’)and the ones of conscientialism (which is in turn a subtler form ofnatural attitude) as well, since it includes in itself the shadow of‘not-individually-lived’. It marks Husserl’s first effort to institute akind of enlarged, pre- and trans-individual experience, whereinthe role of passivity and body are not left to a naturalisticexplanation but recovered in a transitional and synthetic sphereas a ‘functioning life’, which never resumes itself in Erlebnisse. Inorder to do that, he goes back to investigate the deep functioningof ‘motivations’, whose notion appears for the first time in Logical
investigations and which are now expected to engender thefundamental law of the spirit. ‘Motivation’ designates the rule, thatis not a deterministic causality, according to which consciousnessunfolds and it is temporally connected to itself and to the world.We do not say that in the unity of the stream of my lived experiencedeach lived experience is necessary, necessarily conditioned by the livedexperiences which precede it and are co-lived. If we say that every livedexperience of an act is motivated, that relations of motivation areintertwined in it, this is not to imply that every meaning-intending is one‘in consequence of’. When I become aware of a thing, the thesis containedin the perception is not always a thesis ‘in consequence of’: e.g., when Isee the night sky lit up by a meteor shower or hear quite unexpectedly
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the crack of a whip. Still, even here a kind of motivation can be exhibited,included in the form of inner time-consciousness.2The first application that Husserl makes of the concept ofmotivation consists in examining cultural objects animated by asense. Somehow the spiritual imprints the physical with its senseto the point of annulling the duality of sense and its vehicle. Thismeans that the motivation is supposed to build a transductive3continuity between world and consciousness, object and sense,even without melting completely away in one or the other. On thecontrary, motivations form a third dimension which gives ametastable shape and balance to the ego and to the world, and totheir relationship. Rather than subscribing to an Aristotelian‘hylemorphic scheme’ using a static separation between form andmatter, as if ego were the morphé and the external world the hyle,motivations are expected to outline a more dynamic (Husserlwould say ‘genetic’) process of individuation taking into accountthe becoming of the individual. There is a dynamic andbidirectional relationship between the constituted entity (i.e. theego) and the constituting process.Apprehensions of things and of thingly nexuses are ‘webs ofmotivations’: they are built through and through from intentional rays,which, with their sense-content and their filled content, refer back andforth, and they let themselves be explicated in that the accomplishingsubject can enter into these nexuses.4A static analysis proceeds transcendentally in Kantian sense: acertain notion rises as condition of possibility for another notion.So, for example, the experience of spatiotemporal unities is thecondition of possibility for someone to perceive a living body. Theanalytic nexus goes from some data up to their conditions ofpossibility, making sure that this nexus is a necessary one (it isunthinkable that I could perceive whatever animal without thefaculty of perceiving bodies in space and time). But this samenexus, from a genetic point of view, is no more necessary: it is ra-ther ‘motivational’. Perceiving spatiotemporal unities does not
2 E. Husserl, Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological
philosophy. Studies in the phenomenology of constitution, Dordrecht - Boston, Kluwer, 1989,
p. 239.
3See G. Simondon, L’individuation psychique et collective: à la lumière des notions de forme,
information, potentiel et métastabilité, Paris, Aubier, 1989.
4 E. Husserl, Ideas cit., p. 236.
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‘motivate’ in a binding way, but in a generic one, to perceive alsoliving bodies (which have further specific qualities in addition tothe simple spatiotemporal unities). By ‘motivation’ Husserl wantsto indicate every type of connection (in final analysis referable toa temporal connection) among conscience’s contents: a lessspecific content motivates the emergence of a more specific one,i.e. the former engenders a privileged channel to apprehend thelatter. This is not a causal relationship. The motivational nexusguides experiences in time and, consequently, the temporal(genetic) constitution of concepts, which comes to take the formof a ‘system of possibilizations’ (Ermöglichungen): a first experien-ce opens the possibility of a second and more qualified experien-ce, but it does not entail that the additional level should absolutelygive itself. In no way progress in the understanding of the causalrelations will advance us in the understanding of the motives for acertain mode of behavior. The ‘because’ detecting a motivationhas a totally different meaning from the one detecting a naturalcausation. The unity of motivation is a tangle rooted in intentionalacts and not in the mere reality as such. Properly speaking, thephysiological processes do not motivate me.If we examine the structure of the consciousness that constitutes a thing,then we see that all of nature, with space, time, causality, etc., iscompletely dissolved into a web of immanent motivations. In the unity ofthe total lived experience, which comprises consciousness of a thingthere and of an Ego here with its Body, we find distinguishableobjectivities of many kinds, and we also find functional dependencieswhich are not dependencies of an actual thing on the actual Body and theactual Ego in the world, which, in short, are not natural-scientific psychicand psychophysical dependencies. But then neither are they dependenci-es of subjective appearances (as possessed by the subject of lived experi-ence) on real Objectivities that are posited or received as real.5In this perspective we have to read Husserl’s attempt to correcthis first interpretation of ‘animation’, which he had carried out ina very naturalistic way in Part Two of the second volume of Ideas,by way of a cultural understanding under the label of ‘expression’.The new description emphasizes the extent to which an inter-pretation of the soul which took its departure from localizedsensations had to remain naturalistic. The animation of sensiblephenomena can never be exhaustive, since it cannot go through
5Ibid., p. 230.
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the opacity of a worldly object without dispersing in a certainmeasure in it. So, the ‘expression’ is constantly tried out by therisk of ambiguity6. This attempt is doomed to failure until Husserldoes not realize that the third and deeper synthesis acted bymotivations is an issue of the third temporal synthesis, integratingthe retentive and the reproductive ones. Thus, the Italianphenomenologist Enzo Paci (in the Appendix to the Italiantranslation of Phénoménologie et praxis, by J.T. Desanti)7 statesthat motivation is a sort of ‘transcendental schema’, translating, asI have already hinted, the Erlebnisse into decisions and actions. Iwill stop a little longer on this parallelism. Husserl does not wantto get out of lived experiences (Erlebnisse), but motivationsrequire precisely such an excess, like the transcendental schemarequires images. This is the excess of what is never subjectivelylived in strict sense, but nevertheless is inherited. After all, it is thesame excess of the Idea (Plato) or of the Transcendental (Kant).So, in the issue of transcendental it is at stake also the relationbetween the living and the dead8.Kant expounds his theory of Schematism in Book II, chapterI, of «Transcendental analytic», after a chapter entitled «Transcen-dental deduction of the pure concepts of understanding» (I willfollow the first edition of the Critique of pure reason [1781]). Thistranscendental deduction is made by three synthesis (that Kantcannot manage to structure all the way): synthesis ofapprehension, reproduction and recognition, which I maintain tomatch to the Husserlian primary memory (retention), secondarymemory (reproduction), and ‘tertiary memory’ (image conscious-ness), as Bernard Stiegler calls it9. Yet, contrary to Husserl, Kantblends the reproductive faculty with the apprehensive one, descri-bing the former as if it were the latter. This sort of transitivity ismade possible by the intervention of imagination in perception.So, Kant lays the foundations to grasp the relationship between
6Ambiguity and misunderstanding usually pertain, by Husserl’s Logical investigations, to
‘indication’ (Anzeichen) rather than to ‘expression’ (Ausdruck).
7E. Paci, Sui rapporti tra fenomenologia e marxismo, in J.T. Desanti, Fenomenologia e prassi.
Marxismo e filosofia di Husserl, Milano, Lampugnani Nigri, 1971, pp. 103-122; I make
reference to p. 108.
8Incidentally, Husserl himself (Hua XI: 149, 167 ff., 178) suggests that every realization of
the living present, that is every realization of a sense or an object deposits itself in the area of
the dead or rather in a sleeping horizon-sphere which constitutes a constant order of
sedimentation.
9For this analysis, I am in debt to B. Stiegler, Technics and time, 3: Cinematic time and the
question of malaise, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2010, pp. 35-78.
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primary and secondary memory (which Husserl will strictlyexclude). Retention is straightaway a reproduction. The confusionof the two forms of memory is equivalent to the confusion of thetwo forms of synthesis, and it rebounds also on the definition ofthe third synthesis, that of recognition10. The function of recogni-tion is to guarantee the coherence of consciousness with itselfinasmuch it is a flux. Consciousness unifies itself through itsobjects and this unification is named ‘transcendental’ since itshows an a priori necessity, which attests a rule (that is a con-cept). Recognition abstracts a unity from the multiplicity of repro-duction and allows it to get a legality. Starting from the repro-ducible past, the synthesis of recognition unifies the flux of con-sciousness and grounds the two previous synthesis; in this way, italso prepares and projects the homogeneous future of flux itselfand the objects constituting in it. Recognition is a productionwhich entails the matter of a re-production (second synthesis),demanding in turn an apprehension (first synthesis) of perce-ption.At this stage we shall tackle the question of Schematism. Theproduction is also a kind of figuration and in 1787 Kant talks,indeed, about a figurative synthesis (or synthesis speciosa). ‘Tofigure’ is the translation of the Greek verb skematizo. Everyschema, even in the Kantian acceptation, cannot do without animage, notably an empirical and accidental one. So, the synthesisof recognition slowly reveals its nature: it can unify and projectthe other two synthesis because it is rooted in the images that thesecondary memory reproduces, or rather it can imagine. Theschematisation is the process that projects the internal sense intoimages, making it accessible by the external sense. What is atstake here is the possibility of the transmission and heritage ofknowledge (which is in effect the question of transcendentalitself): Kant, like Husserl in the Crisis, refers to Thales and to theconnection between concept and image in geometry. Schematismbecomes the ‘hidden art’ which allows the construction and thearticulation of concepts. But if every recognition is ipso facto aprojection, it is so thanks to the opening and sketchiness oftemporal flux of consciousness: schema can produce a knowledge
10That is the reason why Kant, in 1787, will write a new version of «Transcendental
deduction», wherein the triple synthesis disappears to advantage two new forms of
‘intellectual synthesis’ with the goal of submitting the imagination to the legality of
understanding and the internal sense to the unity of apperception.
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just because it unifies the reproduced past images. This is theenigma of reminiscence. Figuring is necessary to knowledgebecause the origin of consciousness is not concurrent to itself. Theneed of schemata makes the circle of consciousness never to beclosed, since reminiscence always entails oblivion. For this reasonthe three synthesis can be linked neither causally nor determi-nistically.Why, then, can we state that motivations are a kind oftranscendental schema? Husserl argues that the ego constitutesitself in the unity of a history, that is in a certain form of time:temporal flux, in its synthetic unity of retentions and protentions,organizes its universal form of ‘motivation’. According to Husserl,retentions motivate protentions. This looks simple at first: thecontent of protentions can nothing but derive from what has beenexperienced, that is from the Erlebnisse ‘retented’ in retentions. Inthe Appendix I of the Bernauer Manuskripte, Husserl speaks ofretention as the motivation for protention («und dadurchmotiviert eine Protention auf ‘Fortsetzung’»11). Retentions offer acontent to intentionality (protentions without retentions areempty, we could say); thus retentions constitute the roots of whatHusserl calls ‘passive synthesis’, representing the primal processof constitution of all intentional contents and of subjectivity itself.But Husserl affirms as well that protentions are inverted reten-tions («die Protention umgestülpte Retention ist»12) and I believehe is right, although to all appearances retentions and protentionsdo not seem symmetric processes: I maintain that if protentionswithout retentions are empty, retentions without protentions areblind. The fact that at the beginning there is a synthesis, the factthat the origin is not a punctual impression but rather a retention(as Husserl himself glimpses and Derrida will emphasize) makesthe beginning to be, at the same time, protentionally ahead to it-self. This is a decisive crux, since it means that there is somethingin memory that makes it immediately a protention: not by chancethe third Kantian synthesis, which is a figurative memory (follo-wing Bernard Stiegler I have called it ‘tertiary memory’), is inter-preted by Heidegger as a protentional synthesis (the synthesis ofprecognition or future)13. Individual is the issue of this temporal
11E. Husserl, Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein, Dordrecht, Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2001, p. 18.
12 Ibid., p. 17.
13M. Heidegger, Phenomenological interpretation of Kant’s Critique of pure reason,
Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1997, p. 264.
95 Francesca Dell’Orto
‘inordinance’14 wherein each synthesis, in default of origin, doesnot subsist without the others. Retentions and protentions lay ona line of continuity by virtue of the third memory which makes upfor the finitude of consciousness: on the one hand it recovers thepast events that are never been properly ‘lived’ (this is the horizonof inheritance), and on the other hand it constitutes an empiricalek-stasis, an exposition of consciousness projecting and antici-pating it out of itself. Cultural and trans-individual backgroundemerges as constitutive for subjective individuation.These observations are meaningful to recast the Husserliannotion of motivation. If motivation is this kind of schema media-ting synthesis of ‘no-longer-now’ and ‘not-yet-now’, it has to sharewith it at least such a feature: the necessity of an external support,or ‘prosthesis’15, and for this reason keeping its genesis and dyna-mic ultimately opaque. As I have underlined above, it speaksvolumes that Husserl always connects motivations to the culturalfield. All objects of art and culture down to the humble utensils ofeveryday life are transmuted, along with motivations – that is a-long with tertiary memories – into the world of the spirit. Moti-vations prevent the spirit to be split up in subjective andobjective: we can grasp the sense of the world in its unity becausewe start from the living being in which it is imprinted, and ourfirst lived experience, the one of body, is already the experience ofa cultural object. The body is imprinted with sense like a book or atemple since it is our first tertiary memory and our first future.Describing motivations like a schema means describingthem like a mechanism of transduction in which the ego indivi-duates itself through the mediation of retentions and protentions,i.e. through cultural artefacts exceeding consciousness. Thus, mo-tivations abandon the binary or dual epistemology (the oppo-sition, remnant of the rationalist and empiricist traditions,between the ideality of a pure consciousness and the reality of anopaque sensation) that Heidegger and Derrida, under differentlabels, referred to Husserl as ‘metaphysics of presence’. Lookingfurther, and going back to my first question, I would suggest thatmotivation, as third synthesis, gives life to that peculiar tempo-rality which is precisely the one of history.
14This expression is borrowed from Shaun Gallagher (The inordinance of time, Evanston,
Northwestern University Press, 1998).
15See B. Stiegler, Technics and time 1: The fault of Epimetheus, Stanford, Stanford University
Press, 1998, p. 152 and passim.
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The ruling dogma of the separation in principle between epistemologicalelucidation and historical, even humanistic-psychological explanation,between epistemological and genetic origin, is fundamentally mistaken,unless one inadmissibly limits, in the usual way, the concepts of ‘history’,‘historical explanation’, and ‘genesis’ (Hua VI, Appendix III: 370).16The realm of motivations can finally be named the realm ofhistory, the imaginative threshold between time of consciousnessand time of the world. And if this temporality ruins the status oftranscendental (as Kant knew and avoided by deleting, in 1787,the triple synthesis, and as Husserl also knew and avoided by de-nying to image consciousness the constitutive power), never-theless the opposition between empirical and transcendentalmust be overcome without losing the necessary deferring of factsand rights, that is assuring a criterion for decision, which will ne-ver be something of merely factual. The notion of motivation callsus to this philosophical mission.
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16E. Husserl, The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology: an
introduction to phenomenological philosophy, Evanston, Northwestern University Press,
1970, p. 370.
